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Tl!I: SU PR HIE COURT OF TllL STATE OF UTA!!

SEARLE B!WTllERS, a partnership,
DIAMO?iD llILLS ~!OT.LL, a partnership,
RANCE W. SEARLE, RHETT A. SEARLE
and RANDY H. SEARLE,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

Case No. 15604

vs.
EDLEAN SIARLE,
Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF ON APPEAL OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS

***********
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case involves

~n

appeal from final orders of

the lower Court, Honorable David Sam, Judge, dismissing
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint with prejudice and holding that
a prior judgment of the same Court, Honorable George E. Ballif,
Judge, Case No. 5790 (Searle vs. Searle), is res judicata as
to the claims of these plaintiffs and appellants as to an
interest in real property, these plaintiffs and appellants not
having been parties to said Case No. 5790.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was submitted to the Court on stipulated
LLL'ts

and memoranda of authority.

From an order dismissing
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the p1:iintiffs' J\mendcd Complaint 1-,itli prejudice, plaintirrs
appeal.
RU.Ill SLlllC:llT m; i\Pl'i: \L

Plaintiffs and appe1 Ll!lts seek reversal of the Lo1ver
Court's orders dismissing plaintiffs' /\mendeLl Complaint with
prejudice, wherein plaintiffs sollght a determination of their
ownership in real property and a partition of that interest.
STATL\lf'lff OF F:\CTS

This matter was submitted to the Court below on
stipulated facts for a determination as to whether or not the
Judgment of the Court in a prior case, to which plaintiffs were
not parties, is res judicata as to the claims of plaintiffs in
the matter now before the Court.
1977, R-G7)

(~linutc

Lntry dateLl

~lay

3l,

These agreed facts as shown by the pleadings and

memoranda of counsel demonstrate that plaintiff SEARLE BROTJIERS
is a partnership consisting of plaintiffs RANlT IV.
RHETT A. SEARLE and RANDY B. SEARLE.

SEJ\RLE,

Searle Brothers Partner-

ship, is in turn a 50% owner of another partnership, Di.amond
Hills

~lotel.

The other 50% interest of the Diamond Hills

Partnership is owned by WOODEY B. SEARLE.
R-114).

~lotel

(TR 134, Case 5790;

WOODEY B. SEARLE is the father of the indiviclual

plaintiffs, RANCE \\1. SEARLE, RllETT A.

SE:\RLE and RANDY B.

SEARLl

and the defendant EDLEAN SEARLE is the motlwr of o;uch plaintiff'
(R-35,

68).

l\'OODEY B. SEARLE and clcfencLrnt J:llLEAN SEi\RLI:,

previously husband and 1'ifc, \H'rc divorced by llccrce of the
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l!intah c:uunty District Court elated

~lay

17, 1973.

(R-105-113)

On January 16, 1967, the real property in question
l1creinaFtcr referred to as the "Slaugh House" 1vas purchased
and pai'l for hy check 1101384, drawn on the account of the
partnership, lllMIOND IlILLS

~IOTEL,

but the deed to the property

was inadvertently prepared showing WOODEY B. SEARLE as the
grantee.

(Def's. Ex. #12, Case No. 5790; R-118; TR-243, 249,

260, Case No. 5790; R-115, 116).
The books and records of DIM!OND HILLS MOTEL partnership have, since 1967, shown the "Slaugh llouse" to be an asset
of that partnership and all rentals therefrom up to the time
of the divorce decree between WOODEY B. SEARLE and EDLEAN SEARLE
were divided equally between WOODEY B. SEARLE and the plaintiff,
SEARLE BfW'J'HERS partnership.

(Def's. Ex. #12, Case No. 5790;

R-118).
During or about the year 1972, EDLEAN SEARLE commenced
an action for divorce against WOODEY B. SEARLE in the District
Court of Uintah County, State of Utah, Case No. 5790, the
l!onorable George E. Ballif, sitting as Judge.

EDLEAN SEARLE,

in the divorce action, claimed that the "Slaugh House" was an
asset of the marriage between her and WOODEY B. SEARLE, which
position was disputed by WOODEY B. SEARLE, who claimed the
"Slaugh llouse" to be the property of the DIM!OND HILLS MOTEL
partnership and thereby 50% thereof was actually owned by
SFl\RL[ RJWTilERS partnership, the plaintiff in this action.
(Jlcf';;. Lx. 1!12, Case No. 5790; R-118).

The Court, in the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 3-

divorce action, chose to adopt the; position ol E!JLLl\N
and a1varded her the "Slaugh llou::-,e"

<ls

part of

ht~r

,<;J:/\IU,E

dis tr i liut ive

share of the marriage assets in the Decree of Divorce.
(Paragraph 2(d) Decree of Divorce, C:ase

No.

5790; R-107).

Neither party to the divorce action, nor the Court,
moved or ordered that the SEJ\RLL BROTHERS partnership or the
other plaintiffs herein be made parties to the divorce action
although the plaintiffs and appellants in this action were
within the jurisdiction of the Court and service of process
could have heen obtained for that purpose.

Plaintiffs in this

action, RHETT A. SEARLE and RANDY B. SEARLE, did testify in
the divorce GJction concerning their interest in the DIAMOND ll1Ll
MOTEL partnership, but neither was interrogated specifically
about the "Slaugh House".

(TR, Case No. 5790, 196-204, 261-263)

Based on this record and indicated facts, the Court
below ruled that the plGJinti ffs'

interest in the "Slaugh !louse"

was foreclosed by the Decree of Divorce in Case No. 5790; that
said Decree was res judicata as to these plaintiffs; and that
in any event the claims of the plaintif [s to the "Slaugh House"
were barred on the grounds of collateral estoppel.

The Court

below thereupon dismissed the Amended Complaint of the plaintiff
with prejudice.

(R-80, 81-82, 85-86).

It is from these orders that plaintiffs appeal.
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ARGU0IENT
POINT 1
TIIE

LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THl\T THESE PLl\INTIFFS

AND APPHL1\N'fS WERE BOUND BY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE IN CASE NO.
5790 (SEl\RLE VS. SEl\RLE), UINTAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, THESE

PLl\INTIFFS AND APPELLANTS NOT BEING PARTIES TO SAID CASE NO.
5790.
The orders of the Court below, being summary in nature
and based upon stipulated facts, these facts as alleged in
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and as hereinabove set forth,
must be considered as established for the the purposes of this
appeal.

(Frederick May

P. 2d 266)

& Company

vs. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368

Thus the questions on appeal are reduced to a

determination of whether, as a matter of law, such facts compel
a finding of res ju<licata and estoppel against these plaintiffs
and appellants.

Plaintiffs respectfully submit that they do not.

This Supreme Court in the case of Tanner vs. Bacon,
(1'173)
103 Utah 494, 136 P. 2d 957, held:
"It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata
does not operate to affect strangers to a judgment.
It only affects the parties and their successors in
interest and those who are in privity with a party
thereto. The word "privity" refers to a mutual or
successive relationship to the same right or property.
As applied to judgments or decrees of court, the
word means one whose interest has been legally
represented at the time."
The foregoing principle of law has likewise been
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in the cases of Colemen vs.
\:utkovich vs.

Summit County, 556 P. 2d 503; Bank of Vernal vs.
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ll_i_!l_t:_:"._l} ___c:~Jlt~1_!r,_122_l_J~ith\ 1 U,

2 ,11 I'._

'd ',~',I;

\'S._~oya_l_5;1g_ye__ J_~1,;uranL-c~c1111_11;111_iL·>·,

1 n s u r a nc_ l' _C~o_1_11p ;1 nLY_:' .

tederal

',(,[I'.

JC'!_ CJl,__Co_ l(l" 1-:1L i ()lln,_

L;~_n<l Llank_Q.LJ~_e_t:_b_c'J:_(:_Y__\'_:::_:__ ~;1-'-~~'_,_

The principle is also discussed

480.

in

,\ki':11_t)

:'cl

\'~.

l':Hks

ll~~-;_1'~·~1nion

S 7__ 1 _I'. __ ~ <l__} c; ).'!_;

a!ld

8_'7 U_tal1 l_~Ci_, __ ~_8 _ _1_'__:__ 2cl
_Ll_'.1__11:1_11._~Tur._Zd__,_

paragraphs SlS-532.
Some examples of privity are:

J:xecutor with testator

heir with ancestor; ass.ignec \v.ith assignor (hut not assignor
with assignee); clonee with donor; and lessee with lessor.
Privity means "derivative interest".

(Hodgson vs.

Midwest Oil Compai:!__r_,__ ~~Jyorning, 17 Federal 2d 71).

The

term "privity" denotes a mutual and successive relationship to
(T<~ylor

the same rights or property.
262 P.

~_Q_).

vs:__!l_::ukcr~~t~

534,

Plaintiffs take the position that at the time of

the hear j ng of the di vo rec case be fore Judge Ballif, there was
no privity between these plaintiffs in this case and WOODEY B.
SEARLE.

Their interests in the property in question 11·ere not

mutual an<l were not the same.

Plaintiffs do not claim any part

of the interest of WOODHY B. SEARLE, but assert their own
independent and separate partnership interest to

so~

of the

property involved, the "Slaugh House".
It appears clear that partnership interests are not
privy to each other.

Such interests are separate and distinct,

rather than successive ancl mutual, and, consequentlr, plaintiff:
interests in the property in this case are not privy to the
interests of \l/OODEY B. SE!\RLE.
209,

209 P.

2d 387).
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To further clcrnonstratc the point, partners arc
cJi:1r;1ctcr·1 :·.cd as l:O-Ohners of specific partnership property
undc r

_?e~:~_i_si__1_1__4ll_:-_l~ 2_?_(_lj__,____ll_tah_C:_'2_c~n__I_~!~1.tccl

lCJS3, as amended.

Such an interest is the exact opposite of successive or privy
interests.

In fact one partner may even have a lien on the

partner:ohip interest of another partner.

(0lartin vs. Carl isle,

:'l_f2___Qkla_li_oma 268, 148 P. 833, 6 A.L.R. 154).
The property in question, the "Slaugh llouse", having
heen purchased with parinership money, it was a partnership asset
irrespective of the fact that title was taken in the name of one
of the partners, WOODEY B. SEARLE,

(Fullmer vs. Blood

546 P.

]_ll___()_O_ii_), and ll'OODEY B. SEARLE, as a partner, had no right to
enlarge his interest in partnership assets by any statement
which may have been attributed to him in the divorce action,
nor did the Court in that divorce action have any power or
authority to litigate and rule upon the interests of these
plaintiffs in the property in question without these plaintiffs
having been made a party to the divorce action.
The defendant argued in her memorandum to the trial
COllrt that since WOODEY B. SEARLE was a partner of these
plaintiffs, he was also their agent for the purposes of receiving
notice and taking action with respect to matters involving the
specific partnership interests of these plaintiffs.

While a

partner is the agent of the partnership for purposes of partnership business while acting within the scope of his authority,
1:--cct

iun 1\8-1-6 to 48-1-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended),
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such agency cloes not extend hcyo11,\ p:1rt11(·1ship alfairs.

The

fact that a partner, \\(ll)JlLY 11. SJ:i\IZLI., 1:;1s sued for divorc·c
did not make him an agent of the other partn('.t·s 1,·i th respect
to partnership property, nor in any h·ay make the partnership
or the other partners privy to the divorce action or in any way
bound by the divorce decree.

(!lillarcl

vs_._l'l_c:.!'nigl_~_

supra.)

With respect to the contention argued by defendant in
her memoranJum to the Court heloh', 1vhich position was adopted
by that Court, to the effect that plaintiffs herein sho11l<l now
be estopped from making a claim against the property in questio
because tl1e) cliJ not assert that claim in the divorce action,
it is true that plaintiffs <lid have knowledge o[ the divorce
proceeLling, but the lai" appears to be clear to the effect that
actual knowledge of a proceeding 11hich might affect one's inter
est in property does not necessarily cause one to be bound by
a judgment in that proceeding (Bank of Vernal vs. Uintah Cotmty.
supra), nor does the fact that one may have the right to inter·
vene in such an action, bind one under a juclgmE>nt in that actio:
if in fact one <loes not intervene (~6 J\~~~,__rar_~graph 53
The Bank of Vernal vs. Uintah County case cited above
appears particularly in point, since in tl1at case it was held
that a witness who testified in the prior action, but was not
effectively made a party thereto, 1vas not bound by a judgment
therein.
supra, an<l ~le Carty vs. _.£,'.~s_o;__v_O' ~--J-~y_:i_1 _ _Slo _1i e __ J_1_1_5_l_I r~n~_c_:_ .f~''.1.Cill_l_l'
supra.)
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The concept

o[

cstoppel j111p1 ies tl1at someone has at

one ti111E' taken a position or failed to take a position so as to
c;u1se an

innocent party to act in reliance thereupon and to

therc::ifter seek to take a different position to the detriment
of the innocent party.
case of

~Jorgan

As stated by this Supreme Court in the

vs. Board of State Lands, 549 P. 2d 695, to-wit:

"Estoppel is a doctrine of equity purposed to
rescue from loss a party who has, without fault,
been deluded into a course of action by the
wrong or neglect of another. Estoppel arises
when a party by his acts, representations, or
admissions, or by his silence when he ought to
speak, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain
facts to exist and that such other acting with
reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and acts
thereon so that he will suffer an injustice if the
former is permitted to deny the existence of such
facts."
Plaintiffs' actions or inaction with respect to the
divorce case between WOODEY B. SEARLE and EDLEAN SEARLE did
not mislead anyone so as to require imposition of the doctrine
of estoppel.

There is competent evidence in the record which

shows that the Court in the divorce case was apprised of informat ion 1vhich showed that the "Slaugh House" was really a partnership
asset in 1d1 ich these plaintiffs were interested.

(Def's. Ex.

1112, Case No. 5790; R-118; TR-243, 259, 260, Case No. 5790;
R-115, 116).

The fact that the Court in the divorce action

apparently chose not to believe such evidence, does not show
any inconsistent position on the part of these plaintiffs or
111,Jil:ttt'

jn any11·ay that these plaintiffs were trying to mislead

either the Court of the defendant herein, FDLEAN SEARLE.
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Attention of the Court is Jirccted to the case of

The L1cts of that case sho1,, a situation hherein the doctrine
of estoppel should properly apply.

I\

recitation of the facts o

that case will demonstrate the di ffcrencc from the case n01v un<l
consideration:
"In suit No. 2888 Civil, defendant as O\vner of
the Wright Waters sought an adjudication as against
all claimants on the niver of the amount of said
Wright Waters as well as its priority. Defendant
employed Tanner as an adviser and consultant all during the litigation. One of Tanner's duties was to
advise and aid defendant in joining in said suit all
parties which had, or might have, claims to water
which might be affected by a decree in said suit.
Defendant was seeking to set at rest every claim whic
in anyway might inpinge on its rights as finally
settleJ in the decree. Knowing this, plaintiff faile
to notify defendant of his claim under Application
4306-A which became Certificate 1310.
Therefore,
''hi 1 e p 1 a int i ff ' s rights uncle r J\ pp 1 i cat ion 4 3 0 6 - A
(Certificate 1310) were not considered in No. 2888
Civil, it was plaintiff J1imself who was at fault in
not asserting them. As adviser to defendant he was
bound to direct attention to all claims challenging
either priority or amount of defendant's claims which
might directly or indirectly injure or affect its
rights. This he failed to do and thus estopped
himself to assert his cla.ims later."
The record in this case clearly shows that these
plaintiffs did not do anything to mislead EDLEAN SEARLE or the
Court in Case No. 5790 so as to support a claim for estoppel.
The position of the plaintiffs in Case No. 5790 was indicated,
but was ignored.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel does not

operate in favor of one who has knowletlge of the essential fact
or who has convenient and available means of obtaining such
knowledge.
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_J'.,'J Kan-="il~-~~ll~li~~-~' cited in r-lorg0:~_-':'._~ard of
~t_<1_t_(C~J_,_a~J~-2-__.?Ul)_ra).

Defendant, herself, or the Court for that

matter cou1d have rnacle plaintiffs herein parties to the divorce
action in view of defendant's Exhibit #12 in that case (R-118);
however, since that was not done, these plaintiffs are not bound
by that decree in Case No. S790 (Rule l9[b], Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure).
CONCLUSION
If allowed to stand, plaintiffs' ownership interest
in the property in question, the "Slaugh House", will have been
terminated by a Decree of Divorce to which plaintiffs were not
parties and under circumstances that do not justify such a
result on a theory of estoppel.
The orders of the Court below dismissing plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint with prejudice should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

A~~-

u~c{___jC-2{j,cac~-u-rJ
Y:
is tens en, for

CHRISTEN, • , TAYLOR & MOODY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
SS East Center Street
Provo, Utah 84601

t

l

-11-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTTFIU\TL Of: ilJ:\l L lNr;

Two copies of the foregoing Brief were mailccl,
postage prepaicl, to Ray E. Nash, attorney for clcfenclant ancl
respondent,

t;Jo-z;f

33 East tlain Street, Verna1, Utah 81\078, thi_s

day of March, 1978.
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